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Abstract 
The paper aims to emphasize the role of the monetary policy and the central bank's position concerning the financial stability in 
the new context created by the global financial crisis, and given that it pursues the price stability, as the primary objective. The 
analysis highlights the need to review the position of the central bank in order to promote a more proactive stance to deal with 
financial stability, beyond the traditional framework of regulation and supervision, but there is a risk of emerging conflicts 
derived from the pursuance of the primary objective (the price stability) while maintaining financial stability. 
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1. Introduction 
Along with the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, the “Great Moderation” period, characterized by a 
low macroeconomic volatility and a non-inflationary economic growth worldwide, has ended, and has begun a new 
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stage of global transformation, for redefining the political and economic relations between countries, but also for 
restoring the priorities of the general policy to reduce the financial instability. On the one hand, the new 
macroeconomic framework underlines the importance of the clear and proper regulation, as the main condition for 
defense against the financial instability, and on the other hand, underlines the strengthened link between the 
financial stability and the macroeconomic policies, especially the monetary policy, to support it. Thus, it becomes 
obvious the increase of the Central Bank’s responsibility, with the monetary policy as an element of the 
macroeconomic policies’ mechanism. 
The complex processes of expansion, liberalization and globalization of financial flows developed in the recent 
decades increasingly deepened the financial system, producing a widening gap between the financial economy and 
the real one, while the relationship between the financial and monetary stability (price stability) had complicated. 
Changes of the financial regimes (liberalization of financial flows) in most countries have made the financial 
factors, especially those related to the “boom-bust” cycle of credit or asset prices, to be generators of the economic 
fluctuations. Changes of the monetary regime during the “great moderation” were directed instead towards 
achieving monetary stability by keeping inflation and returns low, assuming that in this way would avoid the 
potential unsustainable development of the economy and would ensure stability of the financial system. In fact, the 
strong development of the financial sector weakened the ability of the inflation to report anomalies in economic 
activity development, while the furtherance of the monetary stability during the “great moderation” besides the fact 
that did not supported the financial stability but affected her, actually fostering speculative bubbles, given that, in a 
confident and optimistic background for businesses (especially for banks) was encouraged greater risk taking. In this 
context, it is necessary to reconsider the role of the central bank in terms of its primary objective of price stability, in 
conjunction with the promotion of the financial stability. This problem began to be raised especially after the crisis 
started in 2008. Although the central banks were those that protected the economies, they failed to support the 
recommencement of the economic recovery. 
In this article we try to identify the new framework in which monetary policy can operate taking into account a 
reassessment of the role of the central bank given the increasing importance of the general objective of financial 
system stability, but also suspicions that central banks have allowed the appearance of conditions that led to the 
crisis. To better illustrate the research, the authors considered both a review of the literature on the relationship 
between financial and price stability, and a comparative analysis of how the major banks (European Central Bank - 
ECB the U.S. Federal Reserve - the Fed, and the Bank of England - BoE) relate to the issue of financial stability 
after the global financial crisis. 
2. The changing role of central banks 
 The oldest central banks appeared at the end of the seventeenth century (Bank of Sweden in 1688, the Bank of 
England in 1694), followed by the Bank of France which appeared only in 1800 and other central banks that have 
been established by the end of the nineteenth century (Goodhart et al.1994). We mention, in order of their 
appearance, the central banks from Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Japan, and Italy. The 
number of central banks increased from 18 in 1900 to 161 in 1990 (Pringle et al.1993), most banks being relatively 
new, established since the mid-twentieth century. According to a study of the (Bank of International 
Settlements,2009) the last three central banks were established around the year 2000. 
Predecessors of current central banks had completely different role than monetary policy, their main skill being to 
improve the government's ability to borrow money in times of war, many of them being established during some 
wars or immediately after their end (Clapham, 1944; Timberlake, 1993; Wilson 1957; Hamilton,1945). The central 
banks’ roles reflected the history, and were created to meet the needs of those times. Meanwhile, older functions 
such as monetary policy are different now, compared to beginning periods. Initially, the main functions of central 
banks’ early forms were the issuing of banknotes and governments’ bankers (these regnant banks became the classic 
choice for governments’ banking activity), and later some central banks (e.g. in Austria, France, Portugal and Spain) 
were established to rebuild the monetary stability and the currencies’ credibility, the primary motivation being 
survival, and not necessarily wider macroeconomic issues. In time these regnant banks became bankers of the 
banking system and for economic reasons they provided loans for bank customers to cover their lack of liquidity, 
turning into lenders of last resort, but also in banking system supervisors, different function from the current one 
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only and for pursuing their own economic interest and not the protection of the system as a national goal. The 
emergence of public objectives is related to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the establishment 
of central banks was made for public reasons. The introduction of the gold standard confirmed the role of central 
banks to ensure the convertibility of national goods and led to the abandonment of commercial purposes. The 
economic crisis brought about by two World Wars and a changed view on the role of government in economic 
management led to the establishment of many central banks (as public institutions) and the nationalization of many 
central banks. Monetary policy has acquired other meanings by introducing the gold standard, the supervisory and 
regulatory functions were obvious and straightforward, and the changing role of government in the economy has 
created the function of economic development. 
The period after the crisis started in 2007 is not the first time when the role of central banks has been revised. 
Such an approach has taken place after the Second World War, but periodically thereafter, whereas the objectives 
and instruments of central banks received new life. 
The weakening of the Bretton Woods system efficiency in the ̓60s highlighted the role of monetary policy to 
stabilize the economy, bringing it at least on the same rank with fiscal policy. The changes were most obvious in the 
'70s, years characterized by inflation and inflexible markets when central banks became independent, establishing 
monetary policy to ensure price stability. It was also introduced the exchange rate tool, and monetary policy aimed 
to give more flexibility for markets. 
During 1980-2007, the central banks have enjoyed a growing credibility built on the positive results gained in 
this period: reducing inflation and maintaining it at low levels, alleviate recession episodes (the amplitude and the 
time). In this way, it was created the belief that monetary policy was the tool that was able to effectively reduce the 
economic fluctuations and set the necessary economic growth faster and more consistent, the central bank being 
considered the main or even the only institution that can fight with the inflationary phenomenon. Such beliefs have 
resulted in the formation of inflation targeting strategy that has spread around the world since 1990, and central bank 
independence was considered the condition to achieve such an objective. 
After 2007, these qualities were affected, one of the major risks being the loss of central bank independence by 
many pressures on them to carry out activities that go beyond the institutional framework in which they worked 
before. (Cecchetti,2013) notes that the central banks currently face serious risk of being forced to solve virtually any 
problem of macroeconomic and financial stability, although these institutions cannot solve structural problems. Such 
a risk concerns including political pressure exerted on the monetary authority to become, under the pretext of the 
financial stability policy, a component of the financing system of government. 
3. The relationship between price stability and financial stability 
Some authors believe that price stability should be a sufficient condition for financial stability (Schwartz, 1995) 
or that price stability promotes financial stability (Bordo and Wheelock,1995). As (Bordo, 2007) argues that price 
stability is a prerequisite for financial stability. According to the same approach, it is claimed that financial and price 
stability reinforces each other on the long run. Empirically it has been shown that many financial crises were caused 
by significant changes in the price level (Bordo et al.2000), and most banking crises occurred during the recession 
that often followed episodes of high inflation (Gorton,1988); Calomiris and Gorton,1991). This gave a motivation to 
central bankers to pursue price stability objective, which is considered adequate for the stability of the financial 
system. 
On the other hand, in many papers (Borio and Lowe,20002; Borio et al.2003, Blinder,1988) it is pointed out that 
the view that price stability is beneficial for financial stability must be reversed. This idea is argued by the fact that 
the success of maintaining low inflation may induce a too optimistic view on the future development of the economy 
and the false perception about safety may excessively increase assets value. Based on this reasoning, we can 
conclude that stable inflation at low levels can make the financial system more vulnerable. 
Another observation, which confirms the previous statement is that made by Japan's central bank governor, 
(Shirakawa, 2012): “obsessive focus on the stability of consumer prices in the short run as a mean to economic 
stability will actually have the reverse effect of increased instability”, the financial system becomes unstable, and by 
keeping expectations on long-term economic stability, increased indebtedness and imbalances between the 
maturities of assets and liabilities of financial institutions are stimulated. 
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Experience demonstrates that the relation between financial and monetary stability is inconsistent: sometimes 
monetary stability promoted financial stability, sometimes, it embrittled it but concern over central bank's role in 
promoting financial stability is still an open issue. 
4. General remarks on the central bank's role in promoting financial stability 
Every economic policy has its specific objectives and instruments, but financial stability policy is rather vague, 
because there is no clear definition of financial stability and precise means of measurement. The objective of 
financial stability cannot be clearly formulated and formalized, as long as the targets are not well defined, such as 
price stability is formulated through inflation targeting strategy. Such a relationship is reflected in the sphere of 
accountability on monetary policy and financial stability policy. While the responsibility for monetary policy and its 
control belongs to a single institution, i.e. the prerogative of the central bank, the responsibility for financial stability 
and control for the tools for this area are usually distributed among several institutions. 
Based on experience and different views on the role of central bank in promoting financial stability, one can 
summarize two general streams of thought on this topic. One is that the central bank should conduct proactively 
towards financial stability by extending the objectives of monetary policy so as to include financial stability 
(Eichengreen et al.2013) On the other hand, another school of thought argues that financial stability should be an 
objective by itself, followed either by an institution specially created for this purpose or by several institutions, 
cooperating, thus highlighting the difference between monetary policy and financial stability policy 
(Svensson,2013). 
(Smaga,2013) emphasizes that, in principle, the degree of involvement of central banks in promoting financial 
stability refers to certain conditions: 
x It has a legal basis on promoting financial stability, which is provided as a general objective in the statute of the 
central bank; 
x It has its own definition of financial stability; 
x It uses a set of indicators of financial stability; 
x It performs stress tests; 
x It publishes reports on financial stability – to contribute to the stability of the financial system, to strengthen 
cooperation between key institutions and enhance the transparency of the actions taken to promote financial 
stability; 
x It contributes to the operation of the payment system in the economy; 
x It has a role in prudential supervision. 
(Oosterloo and de Haan, 2003) have asserted that most of the central banks have no official definition for the 
financial stability or for the systemic risk, and the responsibility of these institutions regarding the financial stability 
is not explained in legal terms, but in general terms, as contributing, supporting the financial stability or as an 
obligation to ensure the proper functioning of the payment system. The study reveals that the publication of either a 
Financial Stability Report or sections into the Annual Reports on this subject can be considered as the main manner 
for the fulfilment of the central bank ̕ mandate in promoting financial stability. 
According to (Borio,2011), prior to the global financial crisis, the central banks define the relationship between 
financial stability and monetary policy based on four statements: 
x The price stability is a sufficient condition for macroeconomic stability - if the central bank manages to ensure 
the price stability on the short-term (two years), in the absence of the exogenous shocks, then the economy can 
operate without any disturbances, considering that the price stability represents the best contribution of the 
monetary policy to the macroeconomic stability. This concept was specific to the “Great Moderation” period and 
it underpinned to the adoption of inflation targeting strategy.  
x There is a distinct separation between the financial stability and monetary stability functions. The central bank, as 
the lender of the last resort and liquidity provider, is considered the “treasurer” of the financial crises occurred, 
but there is a decoupling of these two functions regarding the crises prevention: monetary policy would ensure 
the price stability while the regulation and supervision policies would ensure the financial stability. 
x The interest rate, as the monetary policy instrument, is sufficient to influence the economic activity, the only 
operational instruments being the short-term interest rates and the expectations regarding its future evolution. 
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x If each central bank would respond by its policy to the needs and problems of their own country, then the global 
monetary stance would be appropriate. This idea of managing the internal problems is a version of the 
microprudential approach to the financial stability: if each independent institution (in this case, each country) is 
“healthy”, then the entire financial system (in this case, the world economy) will be safe and sound. 
 
The global financial crisis has changed the landscape in which central banks operate: before 2007 the inflation 
targeting was considered the only and the best solution provided by a central bank for the macroeconomic stability 
objective, but after the global financial crisis, the central banks have been subject to a strong pressure concerning its 
involvement in adjusting the functioning of the financial markets. 
5. The central banks ̕ experience in managing the global financial crisis 
At the onset of the crisis, the central banks have responded by using the conventional measures, aggressively 
reducing the policy interest rates to prevent the risk of turning the disinflation into deflation phenomenon. 
Meanwhile, faced with a blockage in the interbank market, the major central banks (Fed, BoE, ECB) had to take 
direct charge of redistributing liquidity to meet the banks̕ needs. After Lehman Brothers shock propagation (in 
2008), the crisis deepened, which required additional and special measures - unconventional monetary policy 
measures. The much-criticized decision taken by the ECB, that of raising the interest rates by 25 basis points, was 
then followed by a reduction of 50 basis points, in October, after the Lehman Brothers̕ bankruptcy. Fed has also 
asserted for a “close-to-zero interest rate” strategy, in summer 2010, before deciding, finally, a second wave of 
quantitative easing, in late of August 2010. In spring 2011, the ECB and the Fed restarted to announce the crisis-exit 
strategies. ECB began to normalize its monetary policy, increasing their representative interest rates by 25 basis 
points, in April and then in July, while in November and December to fall again by 25 basis points. The Fed position 
remained reticent, limited to the exposure of the different stages for exiting from the crisis. The deeper than 
expected economic recession led central banks to adopt accommodative monetary policy. 
The diversity of the using the non-standard monetary policy measures are due to the differences regarding the 
financial systems (in the U.S. and UK, the financial system is dominated by the capital market, while in Europe, the 
financial system is dominated by the banking sector), the institutional framework and also regarding the perception 
of the risk ̕ evaluation undertaken by the central bank. In the Euro Area, the ECB attempted to correct those 
components of the monetary transmission mechanism that were most affected. On the other hand, the strategy 
applied in the U.S., was a blur of the boundary between the monetary policy and fiscal and financial policies. For 
Euro Area, such a framework would cause an increasing risk for altering the independence of the monetary 
authority. 
Central banks underpin the economic activity both in the United States and in Europe. Given the almost non-
existent leeway to cut interest rates, their main resource is to multiply the non-standard monetary policy instruments, 
the first consequence of that behaviour being an increasing of the size of the central bank̕ s balance sheet. However, 
the content of the measures differ from one central bank to another. Bank of England and Fed primarily aim to 
reduce the long-term interest rates in order to improve the financing conditions and to stimulate the private 
investment. 
In the Euro Area, the objective is also to reduce the credit cost, but the action is focused on the banking sector, 
the main source of funding for the non-financial corporation in the Eurozone. However, by the announcement of the 
government securities acquisition program in the secondary market (Outright Monetary Transactions), on September 
6, 2012, the monetary policy in the Euro Area experienced a turning point in the sense that the ECB has no limits on 
its interventions in bond markets. This decision is taken to ensure the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
the Euro Area countries. Despite these measures, the economic recovery in the United States is weak and the 
economic activity in the euro area and UK is slow again. On the one hand, the developed economies, including the 
United States, are probably not completely out of the liquidity trap, which limits the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy. On the other hand, the stimulation made by the monetary policy is not enough to compensate an increasingly 
restrictiveness of the fiscal policy, especially in the Euro Area and UK. 
ECB has chosen to support banks, providing liquidity in the banking system and not applying the quantitative 
easing, like the Fed or BoE, which is a measure directed toward providing monetary incentives when the interest 
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rate is close to zero. The motivation for such a decision is that the banking sector is dominant in the Eurozone and so 
it should ensure continuously the financing to the private sector. The ECB did not intend to intervene directly in the 
assets market, but to ensure both a proper functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism in the Euro Area and 
correcting the malfunctions of various segments of the financial market. 
The implementing of the conventional and unconventional measures of monetary policy, at the beginning of the 
global financial crisis and later, has suppressed both the financial deterioration and the economic activity restraining. 
However, the central bank's role was that of providing time to adopt adjusting measures for more general crisis 
consequences. They are not the solution to the crisis consequences, but for providing time. 
In the context of the global crisis, one of the consequences derived from the measures applied by the central 
banks, is the expanding of their responsibility to the political area. The decision to implement quantitative easing 
measures by purchasing of some sort of securities looks like a subsidy of those who are in debt, requiring more 
political and democratic control. Also, the responsibility of the central banks shifts from the carrying out the 
monetary policy to the financial stability restoring. Such an extended operating area means an increasing of the 
central banks̕ constraints, by affecting their independence. 
The consequences induced by the global financial crisis have shown not only that the restoring of the financial 
stability involves high costs borne primarily by central banks, but also that the standard model regarding the central 
bank's role, applied during the “Great Moderation”, should be reconsidered based on the interlinkages between 
monetary policy, fiscal policy and regulatory policy. (Ceccheti,2013) drew attention to these relationships: 
x the monetary policy influences the fiscal policy through the central bank’s balance sheet; 
x the fiscal policy influences the monetary and regulatory policies through the government options regarding 
its financing sources; 
x the monetary policy, through its influence on balance sheets, influences the regulatory policy; 
x the regulatory policy, through its dealing with the sovereign debt, influences the fiscal policy; 
x the regulatory policy influences the monetary policy by modifying the borrowing costs. 
Besides these observations, in the post-crisis environment, it is noticed the need for implementing the macro-
prudential policies aimed at the financial stability objective, as limiting the systemic risk, and which are designed for 
the financial system, thus including also the interactions between the real economy and the financial economy. 
The economic policies̓ instruments aimed at promoting the financial stability (those specific to the fiscal policy, 
monetary policy, regulatory policy, etc.) can be brought together under the umbrella of macroprudential policy. One 
of the most important tools that convey information on macroprudential policy is considered the Financial Stability 
Report, a document published by most central banks. Its publication is the specific responsibility of a central bank, 
and that is an argument for that institution to play a key role in the macroprudential supervision. 
On the other hand, the central bank involvement in promoting the financial stability must be established between 
certain limits imposed by the mandate of the price stability. Such a conflict is especially noticeable when it plays the 
role of lender of last resort. Therefore, a challenge for the next period is that to disentangle the central bank's 
mandate regarding the financial stability. 
Conclusions 
More and more central banks began to expand their responsibilities, assuming the role of stabilizing the financial 
system, turning somehow to the reason for which the first central banks have been established, namely for 
government financing during crisis (specifically, for war-funding). 
The conflict between the price stability and the financial stability is also reflected by the different time horizon 
for which they are designed. Monetary policy is usually set for a period of 2-3 years, which is consistent with the 
economic cycle, while the risks and imbalances in the financial system accumulate during a longer period, causing 
the so-called financial cycle, which can contain several economic cycles. A solution to this discrepancy could be 
widening the timescale for the price stability objective. 
Many central banks pursue, in addition to the price stability objective, the economic development, and therefore 
they take certain measures concerning the use of resources, which could lead to the failure of stabilizing the short-
term inflation and maintaining a sustainable resource use in the long-term. Taking into account the financial stability 
as a supplementary objective and if the economic and financial cycles go in different directions, then it could be 
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generated conflicts between the stabilizing prices and the resource management, as short-term objectives, and 
financial stability, as long-term objective. 
One of the major challenges for central banking refers not only to the potential conflict between the price stability 
and the financial stability, but also to the broadening of the operational framework by actions performed by central 
banks toward the restoring of the financial system. If, theoretically, there is the concern that by expanding the 
central bank’s balance sheet, it will be affected its primary objective, the experience of the recent years shows that 
the real risk of such actions is the impairment of the central bank's independence, because an excessive expansion of 
the central bank’s responsibilities means a greater involvement in the political arena. 
For central banking, the financial stability remains of fundamental interest. The central banks should ensure a 
balance between maintaining the price stability, as its primary objective, and promoting the financial stability, which 
is a more general objective. The latter is found within the area of concerns of those institutions regarded as “safety 
net”. With globalization, it has become a prerequisite for promoting the financial stability that the central banks 
must collaborate with other institutions and financial authorities to exchange information on common interest for an 
effective action to prevent and to manage potential crises. 
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